Identifying training deficiencies in military pilots by applying the human factors analysis and classification system by Li, Wen-Chin & Harris, Don
International Journal of Occupational Safety and Ergonomics (JOSE) 2013, Vol. 19, No. 1, 3–18
Correspondence should be sent to Don Harris, Faculty of Engineering and Computing, Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry 
CV1 5FB, United Kingdom. E-mail: don.harris@coventry.ac.uk. 
Identifying Training Deficiencies in Military 
Pilots by Applying the Human Factors 
Analysis and Classification System
Wen-Chin Li
Psychology Department, National Defense University, Taipei City, Taiwan (Republic of China)
Don Harris
HFI Solutions, UK
Without accurate analysis, it is difficult to identify training needs and develop the content of training pro-
grams required for preventing aviation accidents. The human factors analysis and classification system 
(HFACS) is based on Reason’s system-wide model of human error. In this study, 523 accidents from the 
Republic of China Air Force were analyzed in which 1762 human errors were categorized. The results of the 
analysis showed that errors of judgment and poor decision-making were commonly reported amongst pilots. 
As a result, it was concluded that there was a need for military pilots to be trained specifically in making deci-
sions in tactical environments. However, application of HFACS also allowed the identification of systemic 
training deficiencies within the organization further contributing to the accidents observed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. Rationale for the Study
The continual assessment of the training curricula 
of military pilots is essential for maintaining safe 
and effective operations. Training needs do not 
remain static. They change as a result of an evo-
lution in operational requirements and the intro-
duction of new equipment and procedures. Regu-
lar analysis of these requirements and revision of 
training systems are required. 
All training development proceeds through a 
series of generic stages. The interservice proce-
dures for instructional systems development 
(IPISD) have arguably become the benchmark 
approach for training design [1]. The IPISD proc-
ess has five major functional phases: analyze, 
design, develop, implement and control. The ana-
lyze phase, upon which this research focuses, 
provides the foundations upon which the subse-
quent training design process is based. It com-
mences with a training needs analysis (TNA) to 
identify important gaps between the current lev-
els of skills, knowledge and ability and those 
required to meet the requirements of the task. 
There are two generic types of analysis that help 
to identify such training needs. The first type of 
analysis is best characterized as a conventional 
form of task analysis that breaks down a task into a 
series of tasks and subtasks (e.g., using hierarchical 
task or cognitive task analysis) along with their 
required performance standards. This type of analy-
sis adopts a system perspective and describes the 
tasks that have to be accomplished in a logical fash-
ion [2]. The second type of analysis focuses on 
errors in task performance. This can be done either 
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at individual or group level, whereby errors can be 
aggregated so that common deficits in task per-
formance can be identified. In this way, a feedback 
loop is established between the evaluation of per-
formance and the development of training to rem-
edy such weaknesses [3]. This analytic approach 
can take place in various ways but accidents, inci-
dents and near misses are often analyzed to provide 
a rich source of information for subsequent revi-
sions in training [4, 5]. These data can then be used 
to scrutinize the types of error made so that appro-
priate training can be devised. Patrick suggested 
that training was ineffective if the linkage between 
the operational and training environments was 
degraded [3]. Conversely, well targeted, opera-
tionally-relevant training has been demonstrated to 
have substantial benefits. 
This study applies the human factors analysis 
and classification system (HFACS) [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 
10, 11, 12, 13] for analyzing accident data from 
the Republic of China (RoC) Air Force as an ini-
tial stage in the TNA process. 
1.2. HFACS
As aircraft have become increasingly more relia-
ble, human performance has played a proportion-
ately increasing role in the causation of accidents. 
Dekker has argued that human error is systemati-
cally connected to features of peoples’ tools and 
tasks, and also their operational and organiza-
tional environment [14]. In recent years, the focus 
on error in aviation accidents has shifted away 
from technical skill deficiencies and toward the 
nontechnical (or soft) skills that underpin effec-
tive crew resource management (CRM), such as 
decision-making, attitudes, supervisory factors 
and organizational culture [15, 16, 17]. 
There are many human error frameworks and 
accident investigation schemes [6, 18, 19, 20, 21, 
22]. Such human error classification methods are 
used throughout aviation to help understand and 
mitigate the causes of poor human performance, 
including being used to identify training require-
ments. HFACS is perhaps the most frequently 
used accident classification schemes in the avia-
tion domain. HFACS is based on Reason’s model 
of human error [4]. Active failures, which are 
associated with the performance of front-line 
operators in complex systems, and latent failures, 
which lie dormant within the system for a long 
time, serve to combine together with other factors 
to breach a system’s defenses. According to Rea-
son, complex systems are designed, operated, 
maintained and managed by human beings [23]. 
As a result, it is not surprising that human deci-
sions and actions at an organizational level are 
implicated in all accidents. Active failures of 
operators have a direct impact on the safety of the 
systems; however, latent failures are spawned in 
the upper levels of organizations and are related 
to management and regulatory structures, includ-
ing the provision and oversight of training. Wieg-
mann and Shappell developed HFACS based 
upon Reason’s organizational model of error [5, 
6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13]. The analysis framework 
was originally designed and developed as a 
generic human error framework for investigating 
and analyzing human error accidents in U.S. mili-
tary aviation operations [7]. The same authors 
later demonstrated its applicability to the analysis 
of accidents in U.S. commercial [7, 8, 9, 11] and 
general aviation [5, 13]. They claim that HFACS 
bridges the gap between theory and practice by 
providing safety professionals with a theoretically 
based tool for identifying and classifying human 
errors [10]. The system focuses on both latent and 
active failures and their inter-relationships and, 
by doing so, it facilitates identifying the underly-
ing causes of human error. 
HFACS examines human error in flight opera-
tions at four levels. Each higher level is assumed 
to affect the next downward level in the HFACS 
framework (Figure 1). 
·	 Level 1, unsafe acts of operators (active fail-
ures), is where most causes of accidents in 
investigations are focused. Such causes can be 
classified into the two basic categories of 
errors and violation. 
·	 Level 2, preconditions for unsafe acts (latent/
active failures), addresses the latent failures 
within the causal sequence of events as well as 
more obvious active failures. It also describes 
the context of substandard conditions of opera-
tors and the substandard practices they adopt.
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Figure 1. The human factors analysis and classification system (HFACS) framework [6].
·	 Level 3, unsafe supervision (latent failures), 
traces the causal chain of events producing 
unsafe acts up to the front-line supervisors.
·	 Level 4, organizational influences (latent fail-
ures), encompasses the most elusive of latent 
failures, fallible decisions of upper levels of 
management which directly affect supervisory 
practices and indirectly affect the actions of 
front-line operators. 
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At level 1 (unsafe acts of operators), the four 
categories in the framework represent the physical/ 
mental activities of an individual that fail to 
achieve the intended outcomes. These are skilled-
based errors, decision errors, perceptual errors 
and violations (Figure 1). Violations refer to the 
willful disregard for the rules and regulations that 
provide for the safety of flight. Routine violations 
tend to be habitual by nature and are often toler-
ated by the governing authority. Exceptional vio-
lations appear as isolated departures from author-
ity, and are not necessarily indicative of an indi-
vidual’s typical behavior pattern, nor condoned 
by management [4]. 
Nevertheless, simply focusing on the unsafe 
acts of operator, the active failures immediately 
associated with the accident, is like focusing on a 
fever without understanding the underlying ill-
ness causing it. Wiegmann and Shappell classi-
fied preconditions for unsafe acts into seven sub-
categories of adverse mental states, adverse phys-
iological states, physical/mental limitations, 
CRM, personal readiness, physical environment 
and technological environment [6]. Most of these 
subcategories, with the exception of those refer-
ring to environmental factors, can be regarded as 
what Reason described as psychological precur-
sors for unsafe acts [4]. Of these categories, CRM 
has been regarded as a key factor in aviation 
safety for almost 30 years and has been the target 
of a great deal of research and development and 
is the principle area of nontechnical skills training 
in the aviation industry. The Joint Airworthiness 
Authorities defined CRM as “the effective utilisa-
tion of all resources (e.g. crewmembers, aero-
plane systems and supporting facilities) to 
achieve safe and efficient operation” [24]. CRM 
evolved as an operating concept after a series of 
accidents in which the aircraft involved had no 
major technical failures (if any at all). The princi-
pal causes of these accidents were a failure to uti-
lize all the human resources available on the 
flight deck in an appropriate manner. Van Aver-
maete described three dimensions to effective 
CRM: crew co-operation (team building and 
maintaining, considering others, supporting oth-
ers and solving conflicts); leadership and mana-
gerial skills (using authority/assertiveness, pro-
viding and maintaining standards, planning and 
coordinating, and managing workload) and situa-
tion awareness (system awareness, environmental 
awareness and anticipation) [25]. All of these 
issues are recognizable within the HFACS frame-
work. Training in flight deck management skills 
produces significant beneficial changes in crew 
behavior [26]. After the introduction of such a 
program, Diehl reported an 81% drop in the acci-
dent rate in U.S. military aviation [27]. Aeronau-
tical decision-making has also been found to be 
trainable [28, 29, 30, 31] and such training pro-
duces significantly better decisions in pilots [32, 
33]. 
The role of supervisors is to provide their per-
sonnel with the facilities and capability to suc-
ceed and to ensure the job is done safely and effi-
ciently. Level 3 in HFACS is primarily concerned 
with the supervisory influence both on the condi-
tion of pilots and the operational environment. 
HFACS contains four categories of inadequate 
supervision, planned inappropriate operation, 
failure to correct a known problem and supervi-
sory violation (Figure 1). The provision of train-
ing is a key factor at this level. In the context of 
inadequate supervision, Shappell and Weigmann 
stated that “the supervisor, no matter at what level 
of operation, must provide guidance, training 
opportunities, leadership, and motivation, as well 
as the proper role model to be emulated” (p. 9) 
[8]. The provision and revision of training is also 
a factor in the other level-3 category of failure to 
correct a known problem. This category includes 
failure to provide remedial training where previ-
ously identified as necessary. This is an issue in 
training oversight which is a key supervisory role. 
The corporate decisions about resource man-
agement are based on two conflicting objectives, 
the goal of safety and the goal of on-time and 
cost-effective operations. It needs to be noted, 
though, that the decisions of upper-level manage-
ment can affect supervisory practices, as well as 
the conditions and actions of operators. Wieg-
mann and Shappell identified these elusive latent 
failures as failures in resource management, 
organizational climate and organizational proc-
ess at level 4 in HFACS [5]. Resource manage-
ment encompasses the provision of equipment, 
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personnel and facilities to provide appropriate 
training; organizational process includes mainte-
nance and oversight of operational standards.
Wiegmann and Shappell reported that the 
framework as a whole had an inter-rater reliabil-
ity figure (using Cohen’s κ) of .710, indicating 
substantial agreement; however, they reported no 
figures for the individual HFACS categories [9]. 
Li and Harris conducted further research and 
found the inter-rater reliabilities for the individual 
categories in the HFACS framework ranged 
between κ values .440 and .826 [34]. Fourteen 
HFACS categories exceeded a κ of .600, which 
indicated substantial agreement between raters; 
only four categories had κ values between .400 
and 0.590 merely suggesting moderate levels of 
agreement [35]. Expressed as simple percentage 
agreement, HFACS has shown inter-rater relia-
bilities well in excess of 70% [7, 34, 36, 37]. As a 
result, it can be concluded that the coding of data 
using the HFACS framework is quite reliable. 
1.3. Aims and Objectives
This study applies HFACS to analyzing human 
factors accident data from the RoC Air Force. 
The objective was to identify areas for the 
improvement in training provision and the associ-
ated organizational infrastructure to help mitigate 
the instance of human error in military aviation. 
To do this, it was necessary to understand the 
associations between errors with pilots’ tools (air-
craft) and tasks (flight stages). Pilots experience 
was assessed by their rank. 
2. METHOD
2.1. Accident Data
The data set was derived from the narrative 
descriptions of 523 accidents from 25 years of 
accidents occurring in the RoC Air Force. There 
were 206 class-1 accidents (cost to repair over 
65% of original price or crew fatality), 78 class-2 
accidents (cost to repair of 35–64% of original 
price or crew sustained serious injury) and 239 
class-3 accidents (cost to repair of 3–34% of orig-
inal price or crew member sustained minor 
injury). 
2.2. Accident Investigation in the RoC Air 
Force
The Aviation Safety Unit is responsible for all 
RoC Air Force accident investigations. For every 
accident involving a military aircraft, the investi-
gator-in-charge follows a standard procedure for 
conducting the investigation. The initial stage 
collects all the relevant information for further 
analysis including identification details, pilots’ 
information, personnel involved, aircraft informa-
tion, mission and flight details, history of the 
flight, impact and postimpact information, mete-
orological information, radar information and 
transmissions to and from tactical air traffic con-
trol. The wreckage of the aircraft is then recov-
ered for investigation by the engineering team. 
The final report details the causal factors of the 
accident and contains recommendations for acci-
dent prevention. 
2.3. Coding Process
This study used Wiegmann and Shappell’s ver-
sion of the HFACS framework [6]. Each accident 
report was coded independently by two investiga-
tors, an instructor pilot and an aviation psycholo-
gist. These investigators were trained on the 
HFACS framework together for 10 h to ensure 
that they achieved a detailed and accurate under-
standing of the HFACS categories. The contents 
of the course included an introduction to the 
HFACS framework, an explanation of the defini-
tions of the four different HFACS levels and a 
further detailed description of the content of each 
of the 18 HFACS categories. To develop a com-
mon understanding of the coding process and the 
HFACS categories to achieve a high level of 
inter-rater reliability, the two raters also jointly 
analyzed 2 years of RoC accident data prior to 
undertaking the main analysis. 
For the purposes of analysis, aircraft were cate-
gorized as either fighter, cargo or training aircraft. 
Pilot’s ranks were cadet pilots, second lieuten-
ants, first lieutenants, captains, majors, lieutenant 
colonels (and above). Flight phases were catego-
rized as taxi before take-off, take-off, climb-out, 
in the operational area; descent, approach, land-
ing and taxi after landing.
8 W.C. LI & D. HARRIS
JOSE 2013, Vol. 19, No. 1
The presence (coded 1) or absence (coded 0) of 
each HFACS category was assessed in each acci-
dent narrative. To avoid the over-representation 
of a category from a single accident, each 
HFACS category was counted a maximum of 
only once per accident. Thus, the count acted 
simply as an indicator of the presence or absence 
of each of the 18 categories in a given accident.
3. RESULTS
In the following analyses, the percentages refer to 
the percentage of times that an HFACS factor was 
implicated in the sequence of events leading up to 
an accident. However, in most instances, many 
more than just a single factor was implicated in 
the accident sequence, hence, the percentages add 
up to over 100% across section 3. 
A total of 1762 instances of human error were 
recorded with the HFACS framework. Overall, 
unsafe acts of operators (HFACS level 1) were 
involved in 725 (41.1%) of instances, precondi-
tions for unsafe acts (level 2) was as a causal fac-
tor in 552 (31.3%) cases, categories at unsafe 
supervision (level 3) were involved in 221 
(12.5%) of instances and categories at the organi-
zational influences level (level 4) were a factor in 
264 (15%) accidents. 
The data were cross-tabulated to describe the 
strength of association between the HFACS cate-
gories and aircraft type, type of mission and flight 
Phase. c2 analyses were performed to estimate 
the statistical strength of association between the 
categories. Within each analysis, the adjusted 
standardized residual was computed for each cell 
to establish which cells within the table were sig-
nificantly over- (or under-) represented. 
3.1. HFACS Categories Versus Aircraft 
Types
Fighter aircraft were involved in 353 (67.5%) 
accidents, training aircraft in 113 (21.6%) acci-
dents and cargo aircraft in 57 (10.9%) accidents. 
At level 1 (unsafe acts of operators), there were 
no significant associations with respect to aircraft 
type. At level 2 (preconditions for unsafe acts), 
the association of aircraft type with adverse men-
tal states, CRM and personal readiness was sig-
nificant. Training aircraft pilots were over-repre-
sented in having adverse mental states and per-
sonal readiness as causal factors. Cargo aircraft 
pilots were over-represented in having CRM 
problems as the major causal factor. At level 3 
(unsafe supervision), the association of aircraft 
type with both inadequate supervision and failed 
to correct a known problem was significant. 
Training aircraft were over-represented in both 
these two categories. Finally, at level 4 (organiza-
tional influences), the association of aircraft type 
with organizational process was significant. 
Training aircraft pilots were again over-repre-
sented in having the organizational process cate-
gory as a factor (see Tables 1–2 and Figure 2).
3.2. HFACS Categories Versus Pilots’ Rank
Cadet pilots were involved in 30 (5.7%) acci-
dents, second lieutenants in 10 (1.9%) accidents, 
first lieutenants in 92 (17.6%) accidents, captains 
in 144 (27.5%) accidents, majors in 148 (28.3%) 
accidents and personnel with the rank of lieuten-
ant colonels (or above) were involved in 70 
(13.4%) accidents. 
At level 1 (unsafe acts of operators), decision 
errors, skill-based errors and perceptual errors 
were all significantly associated with the rank of 
the pilot involved in the accident. In all these cat-
egories, pilots with the rank of first lieutenant 
were over-represented. Cadet pilots were also 
over-represented in the categories of decision 
errors and skill-based errors. Similarly, at level 2 
(preconditions for unsafe acts), first lieutenants 
were over-represented in having adverse mental 
states and physical/mental limitations as contribu-
tory factors in their mishaps. The rank of lieuten-
ant colonel (or above) was significantly associ-
ated with causal factors in the physical environ-
ment category. At level 3 (unsafe supervision), 
inadequate supervision was a factor significantly 
over-represented in accidents involving cadet 
pilots and first lieutenants. Similarly, at level 4 
(organizational influences), organizational proc-
ess was more likely to be linked to accidents 
involving cadet pilots (see Tables 1 and 3, and 
Figure 3). 
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TABLE 1. Significant (χ2) Associations Between HFACS Categories and Type of Aircraft, Pilot’s Rank 
and Flight Phase
Category Level Type of Aircraft Pilot’s Rank Flight Phase
Organizational process 4 χ2 = 7.74, df = 2, p < .02 χ2 = 11.1, df = 5, p < .05 ns
Organizational climate 4 ns ns ns
Resource 
management
4 ns ns ns
Supervisory violation 3 ns ns ns
Fail to correct problem 3 χ2= 20.69, df = 2, p = .00 ns ns
Plan inadequate 
operation
3 ns ns ns
Inadequate 
supervision
3 χ2 = 8.28, df = 2, p < .01 χ2 = 26.6, df = 5, p = .00 χ2 = 34.6, df = 8, p = .00
Technology 
environment
2 ns ns ns
Physical environment 2 ns χ2 = 15.1, df = 5, p < .01 ns
Personal readiness 2 χ2 = 9.58, df = 2, p < .01 ns ns
CRM 2 χ2 = 8.35, df = 2, p < .01 ns χ2 = 19.6, df = 8, p < .01
Physical/mental 
limitation
2 ns χ2 = 32.5, df = 5, p = .00 χ2 = 17.5, df = 8, p < .02
Adverse physiological 
state
2 ns ns ns
Adverse mental states 2 χ2 = 7.55, df = 2, p < .02 χ2 = 18.3, df = 5, p = .00 χ2 = 25.7, df = 8, p = .00
Violations 1 ns ns ns
Perceptual errors 1 ns χ2 = 12.5, df = 5, p < .02 ns
Skilled-based errors 1 ns χ2 = 18.1, df = 5, p = .00 χ2 = 63.6, df = 8, p = .00
Decision errors 1 ns χ2 = 11.7, df = 5, p < .03 χ2 = 35.7, df = 8, p = .00
Notes. HFACS = human factors analysis and classification system, CRM = crew resource management.
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Figure 2. Frequencies related to significant associations between HFACS categories and aircraft 
type (see Table 1). Notes. HFACS = human factors analysis and classification system, CRM = crew 
resource management. 
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TABLE 2. Significant Associations Between HFACS Categories and Aircraft Type
Aircraft Type
Adverse Mental States CRM Personal Readiness
χ2 = 7.55, p = .020 χ2 = 8.35, p = .010 χ2 = 9.58, p = .010
Observed 
Expected
ASR 
p
Observed 
Expected
ASR 
p
Observed 
Expected
ASR 
p
Training 51  
40.1
2.4 
<.020
36  
31.8
1.0 
ns
13  
6.3
3.1 
ns
Cargo 23 
20.2
0.8 
ns
24  
16.1
2.5 
<.020
2  
3.2
–0.7 
ns
Fighter  110 
123.6
–2.7 
<.010
86  
98.1
–2.5 
<.020
14  
19.5
–2.2 
<.050
Aircraft Type
Inadequate Supervision
Fail to Correct  
a Known Problem Organizational Process
χ2 = 8.28, p = .010 χ2 = 20.69, p = .000 χ2 = 7.74, p = .020
Observed 
Expected
ASR 
p
Observed 
Expected
ASR 
p
Observed 
Expected
ASR 
p
Training 51  
38.6
2.8 
ns
9  
2.6
4.5 
ns
25  
16.6
2.5 
<.020
Cargo 20  
19.5
0.2 
ns
1  
1.3
–0.3 
ns
10  
8.4
0.7 
ns
Fighter  106  
118.9
–2.6 
<.010
2  
8.1
–3.8 
ns
41  
51.1
–2.7 
<.010
Notes. HFACS = human factors analysis and classification system, CRM = crew resource management, 
ASR = adjusted standardized residual.
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Figure 3. Frequencies related to significant associations between HFACS categories and rank 
of the pilot involved in the accident (see Table 1). Notes. HFACS = human factors analysis and 
classification system, lieutenant colonel+ = lieutenant colonel or above.
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3.3. HFACS Categories Versus Flight Phase
Accidents happened during taxi before take-off 
phase in 36 (6.9%) cases, in the take-off phase in 
64 (12.2%) cases, during climb out in 28 (5.4%) 
instances. while maneuvering in the operational 
area in 200 (38.2%) cases, during descent in 9 
(1.7%) instances, during approach in 55 (10.5%) 
cases, while landing in 68 (13%) cases and while 
taxiing after landing in 61 (11.7%) instances.
At level 1 (unsafe acts of operators), the associ-
ation of flight phase with decision errors and 
skilled-based errors was significant. The flight 
phase of landing was over-represented in both 
these categories of accident. Taxiing after landing 
was also over-represented in the frequency of 
skill-based errors. At level 2 (preconditions for 
unsafe acts), the associations between flight 
phase with adverse mental states, physical/ 
mental limitations and with CRM were all 
TABLE 3. Significant associations between HFACS categories and Pilots’ Rank
Pilots’ Rank
Decision  
Error
Skill-Based  
Errors
Perceptual  
Error Adverse Mental States
χ2 = 14.812, p < .050 χ2 = 22.157, p < .005 χ2 = 14.005, p < .050 χ2 = 21.728, p < .005
Observed 
Expected
ASR 
p
Observed 
Expected
ASR 
p
Observed 
Expected
ASR 
p
Observed 
Expected
ASR 
p
Cadet 19 
13.7
2.0 
<.050
19 
13.8
2.0 
<.050
7 
6.8
0.1 
ns
13 
11.0
0.8 
ns
Second 
lieutenant
6 
4.6
0.9 
ns
4 
4.6
–0.4 
ns
2 
2.3
–0.2 
ns
0 
3.7
–2.4 
 <.020
First lieutenant 50 
40.5
2.2 
<.050
54 
0.9
3.1 
 <.002
29 
20.3
2.4 
 <.020
44 
32.6
2.8 
 <.005
Captain 57 
63.3
–1.3 
ns
65 
63.9
0.2 
ns
38 
31.7
1.5 
ns
57 
50.9
1.3 
ns
Major 58 
66.9
–1.6 
ns
52 
66.6
-2.9 
 <.005
25 
33.0
–1.9 
ns
43 
53.1
–2.1 
 <.050
Lieutenant 
colonel+
30 
29.2
–0.3 
ns
25 
29.4
–1.2 
ns
8 
14.6
–2.1 
 <.050
18 
23.5
–1.5 
ns
Pilots’ Rank
Physical/Mental 
Limitation Physical Environment
Inadequate 
Supervision
Organizational 
Process
χ2 = 33.298, p < .001 χ2 = 16.221, p < .050 χ2 = 31.797, p < .001 χ2 = 17.105, p < .050
Observed 
Expected
ASR 
p
Observed 
Expected
ASR 
p
Observed 
Expected
ASR 
p
Observed 
Expected
ASR 
p
Cadet 6 
4.4
0.8 
ns
2 
4.2
–1.2 
ns
21 
10.7
4.1 
<.001
10 
4.4
3.0 
<.002
Second 
lieutenant
0 
1.5
–1.3 
ns
5 
1.4
3.3 
 <.001
5 
3.6
1.0 
ns
3 
1.5
1.4 
ns
First lieutenant 28 
13.1
4.9 
 <.001
11 
12.5
–0.5 
ns
41 
31.7
2.3 
<.020
12 
13.1
–0.4 
ns
Captain 22 
20.4
0.4 
ns
17 
19.6
–0.7 
ns
45 
49.5
–0.9 
ns
19 
20.4
–0.4 
ns
Major 9 
21.3
–3.5 
 <.001
19 
20.4
–0.4 
ns
39 
51.6
–2.6 
<.010
18 
21.3
–0.9 
ns
Lieutenant 
colonel+
6 
9.4
–1.3 
ns
13 
9.0
1.5 
ns
18 
22.8
–1.3 
 ns
8 
9.4
–0.5 
ns
Notes. HFACS = human factors analysis and classification system, ASR  =  adjusted standardized residual, 
lieutenant colonel+ = lieutenant colonel or above.
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significant. The flight phase of operational area 
was over-represented in all these three categories 
of accidents. The flight phase of descent was also 
over-represented in the incidence of adverse men-
tal states as an attributed factor. At level 3 (unsafe 
supervision), the association of flight phase with 
inadequate supervision was significant. The flight 
phase of landing was over-represented in the cat-
egory of inadequate supervision. At level 4 
(organizational influences), there was no signifi-
cant association between flight phase and any cat-
egory within the HFACS framework (see Tables 
1 and 4, and Figure 4). 
4. DISCUSSION
There were significant associations between spe-
cific categories in the HFACS framework and 
type of aircraft, rank and phase of flight. 
4.1. HFACS Categories Versus Aircraft Types
The results showed that fighter aircraft had the 
highest frequency of accidents (342), followed by 
training (111) and cargo aircraft (56). All of these 
were uncorrected for exposure. 
At level 1 (unsafe acts of operators), there 
were no significant associations with respect to 
aircraft type. At level 2 (preconditions for unsafe 
acts), the association of aircraft type with adverse 
mental states, CRM and personal readiness were 
significant. Training aircraft pilots were over-
represented in having adverse mental states and 
personal readiness as causal factors. Shappell and 
Weigmann suggest that adverse mental states 
encompasses those mental conditions that affect 
performance, such as a loss of situational aware-
ness, task fixation, distraction and mental fatigue 
as a result of stress [5, 8]. It is perhaps not too 
surprising that such factors were implicated in 
accidents involving training aircraft (and, hence, 
trainee pilots). Inappropriate attitudes, such as 
overconfidence, complacency and misplaced 
motivation, are included in this category. Again, 
those are attitudes which may be prevalent in 
cadet pilots. Personal readiness failures occur 
when pilots are not appropriately prepared for the 
flight that they are about to undertake. This can 
decision 
error
skill-based
error
adverse 
mental 
state
physical/
mental
limitation
CRM inadequate
supervision
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90
80
70
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take-off
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landing
taxi after landing
Figure 4. Frequencies related to significant associations between HFACS categories and flight 
phase (see Table 1). Notes. HFACS = human factors analysis and classification system.
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TABLE 4. Significant Associations Between HFACS Categories and Flight Phase
Flight Phase
Decision Error Skill-Based Error Adverse Mental State
χ2 = 35.767, p < .001 χ2 = 63.696, p < .001 χ2 = 25.757, p < .001
Observed 
Ex­pected
ASR 
p
Observed 
Ex­pected
ASR 
p
Observed 
Ex­pected
ASR 
p
Taxi before take-off 9 
15.8
–2.4 
<.020
14 
16.0
–0.7 
ns
13 
13
0 
ns
Take-off 31 
28.0
0.8 
ns
27 
28.4
–0.4 
ns
11 
23.1
–3.4 
<.001
Climb out 5 
11.4
–2.6 
<.010
6 
11.5
–2.2 
<.050
7 
9.4
–1.0 
ns
Cruise/operational 
area
81 
84.1
–0.6 
ns
64 
85.2
–3.9 
<.001
80 
69.4
2.0 
<.050
Descent 6 
3.9
1.4 
ns
2 
4
–1.4 
ns
7 
3.3
2.6 
<.010
Approach 20 
22.8
–0.8 
ns
21 
23.1
–0.6 
ns
14 
18.8
–0.5 
ns
Landing 47 
29.4
4.7 
<.001
55 
29.7
6.7 
<.001
31 
24.2
1.9 
ns
Taxi after landing 24 
26.7
–0.7 
ns
37 
27.1
2.7 
<.010
18 
22.1
–1.2 
ns
Flight Phase
Physical/Mental Limitation CRM Inadequate Supervision
χ2 = 17.553, p < .05 χ2 = 19.634, p < .05 χ2  = 34.685, p < = 0.001
Observed 
Ex­pected
ASR 
p
Observed 
Ex­pected
ASR 
p
Observed 
Ex­pected
ASR 
p
Taxi before take-off 2 
5.2
–1.6 
ns
11 
10.3
0.3 
ns
16 
12.5
1.3 
ns
Take-off 4 
9.2
–2.0 
<.050
10 
18.4
–2.5 
<.020
13 
22.3
–2.6 
<.010
Climb out 2 
3.7
–1.0 
ns
3 
7.5
–2.0 
<.05
2 
9
–3.0 
<.002
Cruise/operational 
area
39 
27.5
3.0 
<.002
68 
55.1
2.6 
<.010
70 
66.8
–0.6 
ns
Descent 2 
1.3
0.7 
ns
5 
2.6
1.8 
ns
5 
3.1
1.3 
ns
Approach 3 
7.5
–1.9 
ns
14 
14.9
–0.3 
ns
16 
18.1
–0.6 
ns
Landing 13 
9.6
1.3 
ns
22 
19.2
0.8 
ns
38 
23.3
4.0 
<.001
Taxi after landing 8 
8.7
–0.3 
ns
13 
17.5
–1.4 
ns
17 
21.2
–1.2 
ns
Notes. HFACS = human factors analysis and classification system, CRM = crew resource management, 
ASR  =  adjusted standardized residual.
include issues, such as mental fatigue as a result 
of gaining insufficient rest, inappropriate nutri-
tion or fatigue as a result of excess physical train-
ing, all issues cadet pilots in a high-pressure train-
ing program are prone to.
Cargo aircraft pilots were over-represented in 
having CRM problems as the major causal factor 
as a result of this category of airplane being oper-
ated by multiple crew members. The c2 test of 
association looks at the relative instance of 
HFACS causal frequencies, so this result should 
not be overinterpreted. Nevertheless, looking at 
the frequency of occurrence of CRM as a causal 
factor (24) versus the number of accidents 
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involving cargo aircraft (56), there would still be 
evidence to suggest that CRM (inter- and intra-
cockpit co-ordination, communication and lead-
ership) could be improved. 
At level 3 (unsafe supervision), the association 
of aircraft type with both inadequate supervision 
and failed to correct a known problem were signifi-
cant. Training aircraft were again over-represented 
in both these categories. Both these categories are 
associated with organizational aspects of the pro-
vision of training, particularly the revision of 
training practices to reflect emerging requirements 
and the need to provide remedial training where 
necessary. These issues are particularly important 
in the operation of training aircraft. 
Training aircraft accidents were also over-
represented in having the level-4 organizational 
process category as a factor. Given that poor 
supervisory practices were implicated in training 
aircraft accidents, it is not surprising that the 
related organizational process category, which 
includes the oversight of operational standards, 
was also involved. Previous studies have found 
strong statistical relationships between the high 
level of the organizational process category and 
the level-3 categories of inadequate supervision 
and failed to correct a known problem [34, 37].
The training aircraft have the highest usage in 
the RoC Air Force, hence, there is time pressure 
for maintenance and the regular airworthiness 
checks. Instructor pilots may also not have time 
to provide the appropriate amount of training/
supervision. Training aircraft are also operated by 
novice pilots, who may not be completely ready 
for solo flight. Fighters were generally under-rep-
resented in all the HFACS categories. Compared 
to trainee pilots, fighter pilots are relatively much 
more experienced and, hence, more capable to 
deal with demanding flight circumstances when 
flying solo. 
4.2. HFACS Categories Versus Pilots’ Rank
A pilot’s rank is closely related to flying experi-
ence: senior officers have more flying hours than 
junior officers. The rank of cadet was signifi-
cantly over-represented in having the categories 
of organizational process and inadequate supervi-
sion. This would suggest failures in the provision 
of training and the oversight of the training proc-
ess. If instructor pilots do not provide proper 
training/supervision or monitoring of progress, 
sending a novice pilot (or a pilot new to the type 
of aircraft) solo, when he had not developed the 
necessary decision-making or psychomotor skills, 
may result in an accident. It is important to 
emphasize those accidents involving cadet pilots 
still had level-1 categories implicated in them 
(suggesting deficiencies in training provision in 
these areas); however, this particular analysis 
suggests that the effects of poor training oversight 
are particularly evident in trainee pilots early in 
their flying career. It was perhaps the junior cadet 
pilots’ lack of experience and competence to deal 
with organizational influences that made them 
vulnerable to a higher level of managerial 
shortcomings.
Pilots with the rank of either second or first 
lieutenant were also novice pilots (with 200–500 
flying hours) at the early stages of conversion 
from training aircraft to more advanced, higher 
performance combat aircraft. During this conver-
sion period, there was an increased accident rate. 
The HFACS categories over-represented for 
these pilots were all associated with the develop-
ment of more advanced flying skills (the level-1 
categories of decision errors, skill-based errors 
and perceptual errors) and the stresses associated 
with a demanding training regime (level 2 of cat-
egories of adverse mental states and/or physical/
mental limitations). In the HFACS framework, 
decision errors are behaviors that proceed as 
intended; however, the plan upon which they are 
predicated is inadequate or inappropriate for the 
situation. They are subdivided into three further 
categories: procedural errors, poor choices and 
problem solving errors. Decision errors resulting 
from misdiagnosis of a situation (and, hence, 
poor subsequent choices) are common in highly 
time-critical situations, such as abnormal or 
emergency situations on takeoff or landing. Shap-
pell and Weigmann included factors in the cate-
gory of skill-based errors, such as the inadvertent 
use of flight controls, omitting steps in proce-
dures or checklists, poor technique or over- 
controlling the aircraft [5, 8]. Perceptual errors 
encompassed factors, such as misjudging 
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distance, altitude or airspeed. The level-2 cate-
gory of adverse mental states in which pilots of 
this rank were over-represented covers the issues 
that junior pilots are prone to at the beginning of 
their operational flying career (see section 4.1). 
Physical/mental limitations occur when mission 
requirements exceed the pilot’s capabilities. 
These normally apply to basic sensory and infor-
mation processing limitations but may also be 
applied to pilots who simply do not have the apti-
tude for military aviation. This may still be a fac-
tor underlying the accidents of relatively inexpe-
rienced pilots new to flying a high performance 
aircraft. 
The rank of lieutenant colonel (or above) was 
significantly associated with causal factors in the 
physical environment category. This HFACS cat-
egory covers both the physical environment 
inside the aircraft (e.g., noise, vibration and tem-
perature—all performance shaping factors 
known to predispose operators to making errors) 
and the environment outside the aircraft (meteor-
ological conditions, light conditions or the ter-
rain over which the aircraft is operating). The 
over-representation of pilots of this rank being 
associated with the physical environment and 
being implicated as a causal factor is probably 
attributable to the fact that senior pilots tend to 
hold the approvals to undertake more complex 
missions in adverse weather or over difficult 
terrain. In the RoC Air Force, rank is very highly 
associated with the number of flight hours 
accrued. While lower ranking officers with exten-
sive flight time may also hold such approvals, it 
is far more likely that they will be undertaken by 
more senior ranks. 
4.3. HFACS Categories Versus Flight Phase
There was a significant association between flight 
phase and six categories in the HFACS frame-
work. At level 1 (unsafe acts of operators), both 
decision errors and skill-based errors were signif-
icantly associated with the landing flight phase. 
In the landing phase, precise psychomotor skills 
are required to control the aircraft and occasion-
ally instant decisions and responses are neces-
sary. This result would also be in accord with the 
number of accidents reported to training aircraft. 
At level 2 (preconditions for unsafe acts), the 
categories of adverse mental states, physical/
mental limitation and CRM were significantly 
associated with the phase of flying in the opera-
tional area. Military tactical training, such as air 
combat tactics or low altitude tactics, places a 
high physical and mental demand on the pilots. 
Pilots need to be aware of the cognitive demands 
while flying in the operational area. Pilots are 
required to be in a heightened mental state to 
allow for rapid analysis of the situation followed 
by swift responses. They also need good CRM 
skills to deal with emergent risks and balance the 
priorities of safety versus accomplishing the 
mission. 
At level 3 (unsafe supervision), inadequate 
supervision was again significantly associated 
with landing accidents (as it was with close pat-
tern accidents and accidents involving training 
aircraft). This may again have been a result of 
instructors failing to provide adequate supervi-
sion, providing inappropriate instruction for land-
ing or failing to track progress and/or provide 
suitable remedial training as a result. 
4.4. Identifying Training Requirements
Inspection of the data in Figures 2–4 suggests that 
the principal pilot training requirements identified 
in this study is associated with the HFACS cate-
gories of decision errors, skill-based errors and 
CRM. 
Some pilots in the RoC Air Force were of the 
opinion that CRM was only of benefit in civil 
aviation or multicrew operations and did not 
apply to single-seat fighter pilots. However, poor 
CRM was not only significantly associated with 
poor flying skills but was also significantly asso-
ciated with poor decision-making. For example, 
there have been several midair crashes where the 
accident investigation concluded that poor com-
munication and teamwork among pilots and air 
traffic control reduced situational awareness. As a 
result, pilots made inappropriate decisions and 
committed operational skill-based errors resulting 
in these catastrophes. Decision-making is a key 
component of CRM which encompasses problem 
definition/diagnosis, option generation, risk 
assessment/option choice and outcome review 
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[25]. Aeronautical decision-making is trainable 
[28, 29, 30, 31] and such training, along with 
simulator practice, can produce better decisions 
[33]. CRM behaviors improve after appropriately 
targeted training [26] and can result in a substan-
tial reduction in the accident rate [27]. 
4.5. Organizational Issues in the Delivery 
of Pilot Training
Many other HFACS categories were implicated 
in RoC Air Force accidents associated with either 
organizational processes, such as the design and 
oversight of training (level 3: unsafe supervision, 
specifically the categories of inadequate supervi-
sion and failed to correct a known problem) or 
the provision of the necessary infrastructure to 
assure the delivery of good training (level 4: 
organizational influences, specifically the cate-
gory of organizational process). 
The modern view of accident causation is that 
there is rarely a single cause to an accident. Acci-
dents do not result solely from technical failures 
or human errors. The systemic view of accidents 
is that they result from organizational (latent) fail-
ures, distal errors and system mis-specifications, 
which lie dormant within the system but which 
serve to combine together with other factors to 
breach a system’s defenses. As Reason observed, 
complex systems are designed, operated, main-
tained and managed by human beings, so it is not 
surprising that human decisions and actions at an 
organizational level are implicated in all acci-
dents [23]. 
The analysis of accidents and incidents should be 
just one aspect of a continuous safety auditing proc-
ess. However, it has to be emphasized that such 
reactive analyses alone are insufficient to ensure 
safety and should be supplemented with a proactive 
approach, i.e., identifying hazards and safety risks 
before they result in an accident [23, 38]. 
Reason’s model of accident causation, upon 
which HFACS is based, commences at a point 
(organizationally) remote from the actual accident 
at the higher levels in the organization. The upper 
levels of management set priorities that subse-
quently have a secondary effect throughout the 
organization. These management decisions are 
more likely to be based around visible, rapid feed-
back (e.g., cost savings and efficiency increases), 
whereas safety gains always cost money, are 
unpredictable (prone to random fluctuations) and 
are often invisible. In this study, it was observed 
that the organizational process HFACS category, 
which includes the oversight of operational stand-
ards, was often implicated in accidents. 
Management decisions are translated into prac-
tice at the supervisory level. Any deficiencies 
here have the direct effect of creating the psycho-
logical pre-cursors of unsafe acts. These function 
types include factors, such as poor tasking, defi-
cient training, inadequate procedures, etc. Inade-
quate supervision and failed to correct a known 
problem were factors implicated in accidents both 
associated with the organizational aspects of the 
provision of training, particularly the revision of 
training practices, and the need to provide reme-
dial training. To exemplify further, poor training 
may lead to psychological pre-cursors of error, 
such as high workload, misdiagnosis or the mis-
perception of risks. 
5. CONCLUSION
This investigation has demonstrated the useful-
ness of the HFACS framework to identify defi-
ciencies in the content and delivery of training in 
the RoC Air Force (training needs) and ascertain 
organizational shortcomings in the infrastructure 
tasked with providing this training. HFACS has 
proved to be a valuable tool in supporting the ini-
tial stages of the training design process described 
by the IPISD [1]. It has successfully identified 
specific training gaps in the development of both 
cadet and junior (lieutenant) pilots underlying 
accidents in the RoC Air Force. This research 
draws a clear picture that supports Reason’s 
model of active failure and latent conditions in 
the organization (upon which the HFACS frame-
work is based) [4]. Fallible decisions of upper-
level command can directly affect the middle 
level of supervisory practices, creating precondi-
tions for unsafe acts and impaired performance of 
pilots, leading to accidents. 
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